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Restraint in Terrorist Groups and Radical Milieus: Towards a 
Research Agenda
by Joel Busher and Tore Bjørgo 
Abstract
Questions about why and how terrorist groups, radical milieus and the individuals that comprise them do not 
carry out more violence than they do – particularly when they apparently have the ability and opportunity to do 
so – have tended to receive less scholarly attention than questions about what leads towards violence or why it 
abates. Yet if we look closely at almost any group, we can usually find evidence of some kind of restraint taking 
place, whether in the form of limitations on what or who is deemed an ‘appropriate’ target, or placing limits on the 
scale or style of violence that militants should deploy. This Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, for which 
this article comprises the introduction, responds to this state of affairs by bringing together a series of articles that 
focus specifically on the issue of restraint within terrorist groups and radical milieus. This article provides a brief 
conceptual sketch of restraint, and makes the case that paying greater attention to restraint can offer rich rewards 
for researchers, policymakers and practitioners concerned with understanding and responding to political violence 
associated with terrorist groups and radical milieus, as well as other forms of political violence.
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Introduction
While scholars of terrorism and radical milieus have made significant advances in understanding the onset and 
escalation of violence,[1] how such violence declines or ends,[2] and why and how militants deradicalise and 
disengage,[3] they have made less progress in understanding how and why these groups, and the individuals 
that comprise them, do not carry out more violence than they do, particularly when they apparently have 
the ability and opportunity to do so.[4] Where this issue has perhaps received most attention has been in the 
literature concerned with the effectiveness of otherwise of violent and non-violent campaigns: a literature that 
indicates that part of the reason militants hold back from further escalation of violence is likely to be that 
such violence is often at best ineffective and at worse counter-productive.[5] Yet even here, this literature tells 
us relatively little about restraint as a process: about where, when and how it emerges, gains traction, diffuses 
through the group or organisation or, indeed, where, when and how it does not.
That this is the case is perhaps unsurprising. Within much of the research on terrorism and radical milieus, 
there are a number of conceptual and methodological factors that direct our attention away from questions 
about how and why such actors do not engage in more violence. These include the tendency to focus more 
attention on cases where violence reaches the thresholds required for inclusion in existing databases than those 
where it does not; the dominance of binaries such as ‘violent vs. non-violent’, or ‘lethal vs. non-lethal’ which, 
while useful in some respects, can leave out the kind of descriptive nuance of varying degrees, styles and targets 
of violence that can encourage reflection on how, why and when people hold back from further violence; and 
the tendency for research on violence prevention to be oriented primarily towards questions about what ‘we’, 
as external policy- , civil society- or academic actors, can do to reduce the threat of violence, rather than how 
members of militant groups themselves can be part of ‘the solution’. Furthermore, living as we do in an era in 
which The Terrorist has become one of the archetypal villains [6] and in which we are often confronted with 
graphic images of, and stories about, the threat of terrorism, asking why such actors do not do more violence 
might seem surprising, spurious or even inappropriate.
This relative inattention to restraint is problematic, however. First, it represents an important shortcoming 
in efforts to understand and explain terrorism and political violence, particularly if we subscribe to the basic 
axiom that effective theory should account for the absence, or at least the scarcity, or low intensity, of a given 
phenomenon, as well as its presence.[7] Second, it deprives us of opportunities to generate crucial insight and 
understanding about how to prevent and reduce such violence.[8] 
The aim of this Special Issue therefore is to stimulate and advance research and policy understanding about the 
processes of restraint in terrorist groups and radical milieus: about how and why members of terrorist groups 
and radical milieus, in many cases, choose to engage in less violence than they could, about how, once these 
choices have been made, they are translated into practice, and how, once applied, these ‘brakes’ on escalation 
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[9] either work or fail. This Special Issue does this by drawing together a collection of theoretical and empirical 
articles that examine processes of restraint as they emerge and evolve, function and fail, within a range of very 
different contexts. This variation includes terrorist organisations engaged in more or less targeted campaigns of 
violence, ‘radical milieus’ [10] characterised by differing levels, styles and targets of violence, and more or less 
formalised groups engaged in civil conflict.
In this introduction, we first briefly outline our conceptual understanding of ‘restraint’. We then discuss in more 
detail what we believe researchers, policymakers and practitioners alike can gain by paying greater attention to 
restraint. Finally, we present the articles that make up the bulk of this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.
Restraint: A Brief Conceptual Sketch
We understand restraint as a process whereby militants choose to drop, downscale or limit an attack or 
campaign, or adopt tactical or strategic innovations that lead them away from violence, whether that is due to 
the perceived risk of failure, anticipation of harsh government repression, concern about a possible backlash 
from their constituency, moral concerns, or a matter of tactical preference.
As the Merriam-Webster Dictionary tells us, ‘restraint’ can refer both to externally imposed restrictions – as 
in a prisoner being put in restraints – and to something akin to self-control, discipline or self-restraint. As 
our primary interest is in how and why militants themselves contribute to establish and maintain parameters 
on their violence – in the ‘internal brakes on violent escalation’ [11] – our use of the term restraint is closer 
to the latter of these two meanings. When security agencies are able to detect and disrupt a terrorist plot, we 
consider that an ‘external brake’. The perceived risk of being detected, disrupted and punished by police and 
security agencies may make militants abstain from carrying out their violent plans – a mechanism generally 
known as deterrence.[12] Restraint emerges as the external brake is internalised as an understanding among 
the militants that committing certain acts is too risky and/or counter-productive and as they begin to adapt 
their plans accordingly.
Our interest in these ‘internal brakes’ does not stem from a belief that they are more important than external 
brakes, but from the fact that the former have, to date, received comparatively less scholarly attention than 
the latter. Neither is it our intention to suggest that these internal brakes should be studied in isolation: one 
of the reasons we prefer the term restraint to the term self-restraint is because of the ambivalence that the 
former affords with regards to the causal roots of the phenomena under consideration. Since an act of restraint 
implies some form of intention on the part of the person who deploys restraint, the concept of restraint helps 
to emphasise the agency of those involved in the decision-making process. This is important if we are to avoid 
overly structural and deterministic accounts of decision-making within militant groups. At the same time, 
however, we can and should acknowledge that restraint, like radicalisation or violence, will in most cases 
be a multi-causal, multi-variate phenomenon, the roots of which might lie within, for example, not just the 
individual psychology and biography of group members;[13] or the group’s ideology or collective identity;[14] 
but also the social ties between militants and their potential victims;[15] the mores and tactical appetites of 
their wider support base;[16] the interactions between group members and their various opponents;[17] or 
the (perceived) opening up of political opportunity structures.[18] This is important if we are to avoid de-
contextualised accounts of how militants hold back from (further) violence.
Indeed, following the basic idea that political violence is always, in the final analysis, shaped by developments 
across multiple relational arenas,[19] we would expect that restraint within terrorist groups and radical milieus 
– or the weakening of restraint – is intimately related to group members’ interactions with their opponents 
and other relevant actors. For example, and as described in the literature on the policing of protests and 
demonstrations, if political opponents, the police or security services make use of repressive means generally 
deemed unjustifiable within that societal context, we would expect this to undermine processes of restraint, 
making attempted escalation of violence by the militants more likely and potentially producing spirals of 
violence.[20] Conversely, we would expect smart policing – e.g. making use of dialogue and facilitating self-
policing – to reinforce emergent intra-group restraint and enable leaders to rein in the more hot-headed 
members of their groups and,[21] more broadly, we would expect that policing strategies that demonstrate 
clear respect for human rights will make it harder for members of militant groups to justify making recourse 
to violence.[22] Within this Special Issue, we have therefore encouraged the contributors to be attentive to the 
way that intra-group processes of restraint shape, and are shaped by, group members’ interactions with outside 
actors.
This way of thinking about restraint is broadly commensurate with how most researchers currently think about 
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strategic or tactical decision-making within terrorist organisations or radical milieus: as deliberative processes 
shaped by, and responsive to, but not determined by, developments within their operating environment, 
processes of organisational learning, and emergent organisational or movement cultures.[23] It is also broadly 
commensurate with how scholars have used the concept of restraint within research on other forms of political 
violence, such as genocide and mass killings,[24] and the use of force in civil wars.[25]
Since we understand restraint simply as a process that comprises holding back from doing more violence – i.e. 
we associate restraint with limiting violence, but not necessarily with non-violence – it follows that we can 
think of, and study, restraint as it operates at any level or scale of violence. Indeed, we argue it is important 
to do so in order to develop a strong theoretical framework with which to understand restraint. Restraint 
within the radical flank of a civil resistance movement that routinely breaks the law but rarely carries out 
interpersonal violence will look different to restraint within an international terrorist organisation that has 
carried out multiple mass casualty attacks: within the former, restraint processes might cluster around debates 
about whether or not, and the conditions under which, property damage can be justified; while in the latter 
case it might centre on debates about whether or not to undertake more indiscriminate lethal attacks.[26] 
Nonetheless, in both cases, what is taking place is a negotiation around the parameters of what is, or is not, 
‘appropriate’ [27] according to a series of strategic, moral and broader cultural criteria. 
Exploring processes of restraint across such different cases can open up important and potentially insight-rich 
avenues of inquiry about whether similar forms of restraint operate and are more or less effective at different 
starting levels of violence, and about the generalisability of insights across different types of groups engaged 
in different forms of violence. This is reflected in this Special Issue, where we have brought together cases with 
very different outer limits of violence.
Just as restraint is multi-causal and multi-variate, it is also multi-final. This is partly about the intentions of 
those who deploy restraint. In some cases, those who encourage restraint might intend to prevent any further 
escalation of violence; in other cases, they might seek simply to limit the extent of escalation, and in other cases 
still the intention might be to engender a broader shift away from the use of (higher levels of) violence. 
What also matters is the ability of those who would deploy restraint – whether they are leaders or members 
of the rank-and-file – to influence the practice of other members of their group.[28] Brakes sometimes fail, 
particularly if they are not well-maintained, or if the conditions are not well-suited to braking; and sometimes if 
the brakes are hit too hard, or at the wrong moment, rather than slowing momentum, those applying the brakes 
might lose control.[29] And what happens then: if hotheads or splinter groups within the movement carry out 
violent actions that go beyond the confines of acceptable violence set by the leadership, do leaders respond 
with exclusion and punishment to maintain the boundaries, do they readjust the parameters of acceptable force 
by finding ways to justify or minimise the breach, or do they themselves reach for greater violence, thereby 
stimulating an intra-movement outbidding dynamic? It is quite possible that we can learn as much from cases 
of brake failure as we can from cases where they work. Again, this Special Issue contains cases both of brake 
success and brake failure, and a combination of the two.
Finally, we understand restraint as a process that might be more or less reactive or proactive.[30] Restraint 
might emerge and be most visible when individuals or factions are reacting to a perceptible shift towards 
violent escalation by other members of their group, or in the wake of instances of escalation after which other 
members of the group might seek to re-establish prior boundaries on their action repertoire: in effect, hitting 
the brakes once it feels that things are going too far or too fast. Restraint can, however, also take the form 
of more proactive innovations that might lead away from escalation, and even towards de-escalation, such 
as undertaking training that enables group members to maintain their discipline during encounters with 
opponents or the security services; developing protocols on the parameters of the acceptable use of force; or a 
strategic reorientation towards attempting to broaden their support base and achieve wider public legitimacy. 
It seems likely that a detailed understanding of restraint in any group, particularly over time, will require an 
analysis both of more reactive and proactive forms of braking, and of how these interact with one another.  
Two recent attempts have been made to develop typologies with which to begin to interrogate these processes of 
restraint as they emerge, manifest and evolve within militant milieus. One of these was developed by Pete Simi 
and Steven Windisch, and comprised a study of the ‘barriers that hinder radicalization toward mass casualty 
violence’.[31] Based on life history interviews with former extreme right activists in the USA, and rooted within 
criminological approaches to the presence and non-presence of specific forms of criminal behaviour, their 
study focuses primarily on individual pathways, albeit situated within the wider cultural logics of the milieus 
within which those individuals were embedded, and how these pathways did, or did not, lead towards greater 
levels of violence. They identify five barriers to the adoption of mass casualty violence:
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1. Mass casualty violence as counterproductive; 
2. Preference for interpersonal violence; 
3. Changes in focus or availability, whereby their interest in, and capability to, undertake more serious 
violence was inhibited either by their focus on drug and alcohol consumption or by non-movement 
related personal obligations; 
4. Internal organizational conflict, whereby growing perceptions of hypocrisy and in-fighting within the 
movement eroded individuals’ commitment to the movement; 
5. Moral apprehension and, in particular, a ‘failure to employ moral disengagement’.[32]
The other typology was developed by Joel Busher, Donald Holbrook and Graham Macklin. Their typology is 
based on documentary analysis of three contrasting case studies: the British and international jihadi milieu 
from 2001 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK 
between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1990s. In contrast to the typology developed by Simi and Windisch, 
this typology centres analytical attention on the group level, and on the practices through which members of 
militant groups contribute to establishing and maintaining the parameters on their own violence, either in 
the form of resisting or pre-empting escalation, or by exploring less violent alternatives. It also attempts to 
operate at a sufficiently high level of abstraction as to be suitable for the analysis of restraint regardless of the 
base level of violence within the milieu under analysis. Like Simi and Windisch, however, they also develop 
a descriptive typology comprising five intersecting categories – in this case based on the logics on which the 
observed ‘brakes’ worked – and there is some noticeable overlap between the two typologies. They identified 
the following ‘brakes’: 
1. Strategic brakes that work on concerns that certain forms of escalation are likely to be ineffective or 
counter-productive; 
2. Moral brakes that work on concerns that certain forms of violence directed at particular targets 
contradict their ethical principles; 
3. Ego-maintenance brakes that work on doubts about whether particular forms of violent escalation are 
commensurate with established in-group identities; 
4. Out-group definition brakes that relate to processes of boundary softening such that some members 
of out-groups come to be perceived as potential allies, supporters or, at least, not an existential threat; 
5. Organisational brakes that relate to considerations of organisational survival and the institutionalisation 
of the limits on violent escalation.[33]
One of the goals of this Special Issue is for contributors to engage with, critique and advance these typologies, 
and to develop alternative or complementary conceptual frameworks with which to advance our understanding 
of restraint in terrorist groups and radical milieus. 
What is to be Gained by Studying Restraint?
As indicated above, part of the answer to this question is simply that it can help us to develop a fuller and more 
compelling account for observable patterns of violence – or non-violence – involving terrorist groups and 
radical milieus. Serious, and in particular lethal, violence by terrorist groups and radical milieus thankfully 
remains a fairly rare phenomenon, and where we see greater concentrations of such violence it tends to be 
closely intertwined with wider armed conflicts. In 2018, just 10 countries accounted for 87% of the total 
15,952 global deaths from terrorism,[34] with 95% of global deaths from terrorism occurring in countries 
experiencing other forms of violent conflict: a figure that increases to 99% ‘when countries with high levels of 
state sponsored terror are also included’.[35] During 2002 – 2018, there were just 317 deaths from terrorism in 
North America: in Europe (including Turkey) there were 2,296, during the same period.[36] 
While part of the explanation for the relative scarcity of terrorist incidents and deaths from terrorism relates 
to the capabilities of many states to inhibit such incidents, it is clear that the decision-making of members of 
terrorist groups and radical milieus themselves is also part of explanation. Not only does one not have to look 
hard to find many reminders of the limitations of even the most extensive law enforcement and intelligence 
systems when it comes to inhibiting the emergence or escalation of political violence, but most of the evidence 
indicates that even within terrorist organisations the decision to deploy or escalate violence is rarely taken 
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lightly,[37] and that such decisions often become a focus of considerable, and sometimes ultimately terminal, 
friction and factionalisation, whether we are talking about groups committed to armed struggle [38] or protest 
groups who rarely go beyond brawling with their opponents or with one another.[39] That this should be the 
case is not surprising: one of the most consistent themes running through the empirically informed scientific 
literature on terrorist groups and radical milieus is that those who engage with such groups and activities by 
and large are not psychopaths hell-bent on destruction, but rather for the most part are political actors pursuing 
a series of more or less clearly-defined political, personal and sometimes economic objectives, through an 
evolving repertoire of action.[40] If we were studying any other type of political actor, we would want to be able 
to explain all of their tactical and strategic choices.
An enhanced understanding of restraint also has clear practical relevance. First, an effective understanding 
of restraint offers opportunities to refine analyses of the risk of violence. It could, for example, be used to 
develop a more precise understanding of where within radical milieus escalated violence is more or less likely 
to come from; of what or who it is that is holding back the use of greater violence and, by extension, the 
conditions under which that restraint is more or less likely to hold.[41] Where understanding restraint might 
be particularly valuable here is in mitigating against the over-estimation of risk and the economic, strategic, 
political and moral costs that such over-estimation of risk can entail.
Second, paying attention to restraint encourages and can enable a more ‘holistic approach’ [42] to the prevention 
and reduction of political violence by conceptualising the members of terrorist organisations and radical 
milieus as potentially part of ‘the solution’. In practical terms, this might translate, for example, into police, 
security services and other agencies integrating questions about how to foster or reinforce internal processes 
of restraint within militant groups, or at least how not to disrupt them, within their strategic and operational 
planning. We believe that such approaches, which ‘work with’ rather than ‘against’ some of the characteristics 
of such groups, can provide benefits both in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
Third, as noted above, debates around which tactics to use often comprise a source of tension within militant 
groups, particularly when, as tends to be the case, they are infused with broader internal power struggles. As 
such, and as the contributions to this Special Issue illustrate, observing processes of restraint provides a rich 
opportunity to gain insights about intra-group dynamics and, in particular, of emergent tensions and fault-
lines within some of these groups. Such information and insights are likely to be of considerable strategic 
relevance to those interested in influencing the actions of such groups.
Fourth, paying attention to processes of restraint can help us to avoid overlooking the basic deliberative processes 
that take place within these groups, or indeed the basic humanity of (most of) the people who comprise them. 
This is not just an ethical position: however abhorrent we might find certain groups, we are likely to understand 
them better if we understand them as individuals, as human beings and all that this implies, rather than falling 
back on demonisation and stereotypes.[43] 
All of this comes with a note of caution, however. As discussed above, restraint is a multi-causal, multi-variate, 
multi-form and multi-final process – in other words: it is complex. It is therefore important that we take a 
realistic and intellectually honest approach to the sorts of claims that we might make, and with what degree of 
confidence. Policy makers and practitioners quite understandably want tools and assessments that they can use 
to inform their decision-making, and academic researchers experience considerable professional, institutional 
and moral pressure to respond to such requests. To date, however, we are at the early stages of exploring 
the possibilities that this avenue of enquiry offers. We can provide conceptual tools: theoretically robust and 
coherent ways of identifying and describing emerging phenomena, and we can connect this with a wider set 
of insights about the escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation of political violence, but we wish to urge 
caution in reaching much beyond that, for the time being. 
About this Special Issue
This Special Issue brings together articles that explore restraint as it manifests and functions in different groups, 
across different settings, and from different analytical perspectives. The articles contained within this Special 
Issue were drawn together across a dedicated workshop held at Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), 
University of Oslo, in January 2020, and dedicated panels organised at two international conferences: the 
European Consortium of Political Research and the Society for Terrorism Research, albeit the second of these 
was postponed due to Covid-19. Articles were selected for inclusion in the Special Issue based on a standard 
blind peer review process.
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The cases from which the contributors draw are set within diverse national and historical contexts; include 
groups that take their ideological inspiration, or justification, from a range of different sources, including, 
among others, white racial nationalists, jihadists, separatists, anti-fascists and animal liberationists; and range 
across groups characterised by fairly strong and centralised command and control structures to groups in which 
members or affiliates operate through highly devolved structures, or through forms of leaderless resistance.
The cases also draw across groups that have deployed vastly different levels and styles of violence: from those 
clearly committed to armed struggle and mass casualty violence, to those where any form of interpersonal 
violence implies pushing at the parameters of what is deemed appropriate. In response to calls to broaden 
the range of cases from which scholars of terrorism in particular draw their insights and develop and test 
their theoretical understanding,[44] the editors have also included analyses of phenomena that, while still 
comprising political violence, tend to sit at or beyond the parameters of what is usually studied by terrorism 
scholars, such as ethnic violence, and political violence that falls short of thresholds usually used to define 
terrorism.
Finally, we have also sought to bring together articles that have different analytical starting points, both in 
terms of the contributors’ primary disciplinary backgrounds and in terms of the basic units of analysis around 
which they organise their research. For some of the contributors, their initial point of entry into understanding 
and exploring restraint is the individual actor and why and how particular individuals within radical milieus 
come to hold back from further violence – and in doing so they build on a number of other studies that have 
begun to attempt to address these questions.[45] For other contributors, their analytical focus centres more on 
the group, and understanding how processes of restraint manifest in, evolve, and shape the tactical repertoires 
of specific groups, movements, scenes or milieus. For other contributors still, their starting point is spaces and/
or places and understanding the uneven distribution of political violence by non-state actors. As this research 
agenda moves forward, we believe that the most productive avenues of enquiry are likely to be those that 
successfully integrate these different analytical starting points.
This introduction is followed by two further articles that survey the existing literature and begin to explore 
central conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues pertinent to researching restraint in terrorist groups 
and radical milieus. The first of these, by Bart Schuurman, is concerned primarily with the individual level of 
analysis. Schuurman argues that involvement in terrorist violence is in fact an unlikely outcome of radicalization 
processes, and that research needs to focus on why most individuals that engage with extremist groups or milieus 
never commit this type of violence. Like several other contributors, Schuurman reaches beyond Terrorism 
Studies as he sets out a series of insights from the existing literature that might be used to help to illuminate 
the differences between ‘violent and non-violent radicalization outcomes.’ He draws particular attention to the 
potential empirical and conceptual contribution of Criminology to understanding non-violent radicalization 
outcomes and the pathways that lead there. He also sets out a series of methodological considerations, and 
offers critical reflections on possible solutions to issues around data access and strategies of analysis.
In the second of the primarily conceptual and methodological articles Leena Malkki moves the focus to 
more meso- and macro-levels of analysis. Malkki’s discussion centres on how analysis of the ‘lack of political 
violence’ and the uneven distribution of political violence across different settings can be leveraged to generate 
insight about the processes, mechanisms and conditions that generate or inhibit the emergence, escalation and 
continuation of violence. Malkki focuses in particular on qualitative and mixed methods research on terrorist 
violence where, she observes, the use of negative cases has been less frequently or extensively utilised than in 
the quantitative literature. The article explores how negative cases have been used within that literature to date 
and what methodological and conceptual lessons can be drawn from that literature, before going on to discuss 
a series of key opportunities and challenges for the effective use of negative cases studies within qualitative and 
mixed methods research designs within the field of Terrorism Studies.
The rest of the Special Issue comprises empirical, case study-based articles. The first three of these comprise 
case studies focusing on far right groups or milieus. Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Ravndal examine processes of 
restraint within The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), a militant and action-oriented National Socialist 
organization that aims to generate revolution and a pan-Nordic white state, mainly through extra-parliamentary 
struggle. The NRM asserts that violence will be necessary to achieve their revolutionary goal. To date, however, 
they have opted to deploy primarily legal means, condoning only limited forms of violence by its members. The 
article engages with Busher et al’s ‘internal brakes’ framework, and examines the logics on which the brakes 
within the organisation appear to operate. The article argues that the NRM leadership does not, in principle, 
have any moral restraints against mass murder in the future since they claim that racial war is inevitable. 
Rather, they refrain from using such methods in the present due largely to strategic concerns that such violence 
would undermine their prospects of gaining popular support and lead to constraints on their opportunities 
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to propagate their political views via legal channels. The leadership is highly aware that the organisation 
might be banned, and activists imprisoned if they let violence escalate too much. The authors observe an 
important ambiguity in how this position plays out in practice. They note that the NRM states that members 
‘planning and carrying out of offensive violent actions will lead to exclusion’ from the organisation. In practice, 
however, this policy does not seem to be implemented, at least ‘not in a strict way,’ and in fact there have been 
deliberate attempts by the NRM leaders to ‘test and expand the legal boundaries on violence and threats against 
enemies’ in order to create more opportunities for escalation. The authors argue that such attempts to expand 
opportunities for escalation should be resisted, not least through enforcement of the rule of law.
Graham Macklin examines the puzzle of why the extreme right milieu, ‘saturated with violent rhetoric, doom-
laden apocalyptic jeremiads […] and the technical wherewithal to make good on such threats,’ has not generated 
as much violence as it would appear capable of. He does this by using a case study of the British extreme right in 
the 1990s. The article traces how the British National Party tried to achieve electoral respectability while at the 
same time militants on its own ‘radical flank,’ belonging to Combat 18, engaged in violent street confrontations 
with anti-fascists. Macklin uses his case study to illustrate how the internal brakes on violence function across 
micro, meso and macro levels, situating individual processes of reflection within movement dynamics and the 
wider political context. He also draws attention to brake failure. In this case, it seems that such failure must 
partly be understood in the context of a movement leadership in a structurally weak position within its own 
movement as the ‘moderates’ struggled to counteract the enduring allure and influence of the radical flank. 
The third contribution that deals with far right milieus is provided by Steven Windisch, Pete Simi, Kathleen 
Blee and Matthew DeMichele. Using life-history interviews with 91 North American-based former white 
supremacists, they examine how homicidal violence is perceived as either an appropriate or inappropriate 
political strategy. They observe that on the whole their interview participants had considered homicidal violence 
to be an inappropriate strategy, either due to perceptions that it was morally unjustifiable and/or that it was 
politically ineffective. They note, however, that homicidal violence could come to be considered an appropriate 
strategy if it was understood as a defensive measure within the frame of ‘racial holy war’ or ‘RAHOWA’. They 
argue that capturing and understanding how white supremacists frame the permissibility of homicidal violence 
comprises an important step towards a better understanding of the ‘upper limit’ or thresholds for violence 
within this milieu.
The next three articles describe activism within various parts of global jihadi networks. Donald Holbrook 
examines internal debates, doubts and discussions among jihadi militants in the UK about the scope of jihadi 
violence. He does this through a study of private online conversations between ‘Islamist militant sympathisers,’ 
including ISIS supporters, and individuals who went on to plan acts of terrorism. Holbrook notes that the 
‘internal brakes’ within the conversation threads are organised around four debates: group identity, targeting 
and exclusion, family and friendship dynamics, and knowledge acquisition. His analysis indicates that while 
participants in these threads were consistent in their support for mass-casualty terrorism, there were several 
points of disagreement around issues such as the targeting of members of the faith community, and the legality 
and morality of public executions. It does not seem, however, that these differences undermined in-group 
cohesion. Holbrook also draws attention to the multi-final nature of restraint dynamics, observing that it is not 
clear that the violence was simply abandoned as a result of these debates, but may rather have been redirected.
Silvia Carenzi examines the targeting choices of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qa‘ida’s former affiliate 
in Syria, and in particular what appears to be the increasingly local focus of their action over time. While 
acknowledging that ideology plays an important role in shaping the strategies of militant groups and their 
definition of enemies and, by extension, appropriate targets, Carenzi’s analysis foregrounds the importance of 
militants’ interaction with other actors and the environment, and with that their understanding of emerging 
opportunities and threats. Drawing on the literature on social movements, she conceptualizes the increasingly 
local focus of HTS as a form of ‘downward scale shift’, and discusses how such a conceptualization can enhance 
our understanding of how groups develop and sustain the parameters on the focus of their violence.
The third case study dealing with the global jihadi milieu shifts our focus to the North Caucasus. Mark 
Youngman examines the case of Kabardino-Balkarian Jama’at (KBJ) in Russia’s North Caucasus republic 
of Kabardino-Balkaria. Youngman describes the growing antagonism between an emergent overtly Islamic 
social movement and the religious and political authorities, and how this eventually results in the movement’s 
leadership, and much of its membership, moving to a full-blown insurgency. What Youngman concentrates on 
in this article, however, are the limits on the violence that followed – arguing that if we are really to understand 
political violence it is not enough to observe simply that a group has ‘crossed the Rubicon,’ but also ‘how they 
came to cross their particular Rubicon and how they behave on the other side.’ While KBJ’s campaign did 
develop into a full-blown insurgency, violence in Kabardino-Balkaria nonetheless remained considerably more 
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restrained than elsewhere in the region. He argues that four ‘brakes’ can help us to understand the more limited 
nature of violence here: the movement’s social origins and ties; the group’s attitudes to the moral permissibility 
of violence; their scepticism about the strategic benefits of violence; and the personal authority of leaders that 
enabled the other brakes to work. As Youngman observes, the case not only illustrates well the importance of 
intra-group processes of restraint in shaping conflict outcomes, but also the potentially high price that might 
be paid when external actors undermine or disrupt those processes. 
The next two articles are concerned with left-wing milieus. In the first of these, Nigel Copsey and Samuel Merrill 
examine how militant anti-fascists in the USA understand violence and exercise restraint in their use of it: a 
timely topic given calls from prominent conservative and right-wing politicians to designate Antifa a ‘domestic 
terrorist organization,’ and the recent first case of a self-identified anti-fascist deploying lethal force (during 
an altercation with a Patriot Prayer supporter, in Portland, on 29 August 2020). Copsey and Merrill recognise 
that physical confrontation has a central place within the logic of Antifa. They argue however that despite this 
recent incident, and despite Antifa’s call to fight fascism ‘by any means necessary,’ the relative absence of the 
deployment of lethal violence by Antifa activists stands in stark contrast to some of their political opponents. 
To explain this, they explore how restraint, both physical and rhetorical, is embedded within the movement 
culture and strategy of action, and how processes of intra-movement ostracization have been used to uphold 
restraint even at a time of intense confrontation with their political opponents.
Raquel da Silva and Ana Sofia Ferreira then discuss restraint within three armed left-wing organisations that 
operated in Portugal both before and after the 1974 April Revolution that overthrew the Estado Novo regime. 
Based on interviews with former militants, they explore how these research participants remember and recount 
the restraint that characterised their organisations’ tactical repertoires, and how the outer limits of violence for 
each of these organisations was intimately related to the specific socio-political situation prior to, and after, the 
end of the dictatorship. In doing so, they trace how restraint from lethal violence, particularly prior to 1974, 
was rooted in perceptions of such violence as both counterproductive and immoral. This changed as parts of 
the radical left milieu became disillusioned with the transition process, with a small faction adopting the use of 
targeted killings as part of their action repertoire, albeit they continued to reject the use of indiscriminate killing. 
In doing so, the authors draw our attention to the interactions between intra-group processes of deliberation 
and developments within the wider political context, and how this shaped the changing operation of restraint 
within the same movement over time.
The final three articles are based on cases that encompass political violence associated with separatist militancy, 
animal liberationism and ethnic violence. John Morrison examines restraint in the context of the Real IRA 
(RIRA), focusing on the sporadic use of violence by the RIRA in the years after the Omagh bombing of August 
1998, one of the most lethal attacks of The Troubles. Morrison discusses the intersection of external pressures 
– the post-Omagh response from the legislature and security services – with ‘internal brakes’, and situates this 
theoretically in relation to political organisation theory and the primacy of organisational survival. The article 
emphasises the importance of, and need for, conceptual frameworks that are able to capture and articulate the 
dynamic interactions between external pressures and internal decision-making processes. 
Rune Ellefsen and Joel Busher explore processes of restraint and their failure throughout the course of the 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign. They argue that even at this ‘high-water mark’ for 
militant animal rights activism, restraint within this campaign was evident in a series of innovations away 
from more militant tactics at the outset and during the final stages of the campaign, and in the resistance to 
the use of interpersonal violence across the campaign, even in the face of a significant escalation of repression 
and policing. In tracing the dynamics of this restraint, the authors observe however that there is a difference 
between the processes of innovation away from violence and the processes whereby activists maintained the 
outer limits of their action repertoire: while the former appear to be heavily contingent on developments 
within the activists’ operating environment and the general fortunes of the campaign, the latter are associated 
with the basic logics of the campaign and therefore less contingent on external developments. This, they argue, 
has potentially significant implications for understanding how restraint functions and sometimes fails: even 
as ‘brakes’ less deeply rooted within the underlying logics of the campaign might be loosened, any resultant 
escalation might still be limited by those brakes that are less contextually contingent and more deeply rooted 
within the underlying logic and culture of the movement.
In the final article, Sarah Jenkins considers how one can explain lower local levels of violence within the 
context of episodes of ethnic violence in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. As Jenkins observes, there are often important 
sub-national variations in the onset, intensity, and duration of violence, as well as individual-level variance in 
participation and non-participation. Explaining this variation is likely to have both theoretical and practical 
relevance. Drawing on field research in neighbourhoods that comprised ‘pockets of peace’ during episodes of 
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ethnic violence in both countries, Jenkins argues the emergence and effectiveness of restraint in these cases 
is closely associated with strong, cross-cutting social ties. Such ties foster restraint in three ways: by making 
interpersonal violence more difficult in the first place; by disrupting emergent us-them distinctions as the 
episode gains momentum; and by facilitating coordination and cooperation among community leaders.
There are limits of course to what can be achieved in one Special Issue of a journal. Each of these articles 
generate as many questions as they resolve: about, for example, the applicability of findings across different 
types of movements, across different phases of organisational or campaign cycles, or to different forms of 
political violence. Nonetheless, we hope that this collection of articles will provide a valuable contribution 
towards, and will inspire further research into, generating a better understanding of the dynamics of restraint 
in terrorist groups and radical milieus and how such understanding can help us to respond more effectively 
and sustainably to different forms of political violence.
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